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Abstract 
Consumers may use multiple reference points-including cost of goods, past prices, and 
competitive prices-to judge price fairness. Across a series of  studies we show that 
consumers are inclined to overestimate profits, often to an extreme extent. We further 
demonstrate that prices are perceived to be unfair because consumers fail to take into account 
vendor costs, underestimate the effects of  inflation, and attribute competitive price 
differences to profits. Potential corrective interventions by marketers-such as cueing costs, 
providing historical price information, and explaining price differences-were insufficient to 
eliminate unfairness perceptions. ill  addition, prices for goods were found to be stickier than 
prices for services and therefore were especially susceptible to these systematic perceptions 
of  unfairness. 
Lisa E. Bolton is Assistant Professor of  Marketing, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. Luk Warlop is Associate Professor of  Marketing, Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, Belgium. Joseph W. Alba is Distinguished Professor of  Marketing, University of 
Florida. 2 
EXPLORATIONS IN PRICE (UN)FAlRNESS 
Fine restaurants gouge consumers, as evidenced by wine prices that are multiples of 
the going retail prices. Music on the Internet should be freely shared because the recording 
industry is rapacious in its pricing. Gasoline prices are too high because they are determined 
more by industry collusion than market forces. Pharmaceutical prices should be regulated 
due to the obscenely high profits made on prescription drugs and the relatively low prices 
paid in other countries for the same products. Such beliefs are not narrowly held, yet their 
accuracy is an issue of  great consequence because the profitability of  firms may be 
constrained by  justifiable fear of  consumer backlash to perceived exploitation (Blinder 1991; 
Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler 1986a; Piron and Fernandez1995) and consumer price 
consciousness and satisfaction with competing vendors may be shaped by perceptions of 
price fairness (Sinha and Batra 1999). 
Despite the apparent importance of  perceived price fairness, research on the topic has 
been sparse and narrowly cast-with much of  it centering on the principle of  dual entitlement 
(Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler 1986b). The principle of  dual entitlement argues that 
fairness perceptions are governed by the belief that firms are entitled to a reference profit in 
return for goods sold at a reference price. The consumer's entitlement is protected by the 
understanding that changes in the status quo cannot be made arbitrarily or merely for the 
sake of  increasing the firm's profit, such as when prices are raised to take advantage of 
surplus demand or newly obtained monopoly power. The firm, on the other hand, is entitled 
to protect its profit when threatened by events such as rising costs. 
The goal of  the present research is to explore a variety off  actors that contribute to 
consumer perceptions of  price fairness. To frame the research, it is useful to note two aspects 
of  the principle of  dual entitlement and the evidence that supports it. First, fundamental to 
dual entitlement is the notion of  a reference transaction. Fairness of  a given transaction is a 
function of  the characteristics of  other transactions or potential transactions. Although many 
reference points seem possible, previous research has focused primarily on the price of  a 
good at a previous time or during a preceding transaction. We examine the case of  changing 
prices-albeit in a somewhat different way-in some of  the experiments reported here; 
however, most of  our experiments examine reference points that are pertinent to static 
environments as well. In so doing, we attempt to obtain greater access to consumer 3 
understanding of  profitability. Although dual entitlement argues that a vendor is entitled to a 
reference profit, participants in fairness experiments are generally provided with information 
about price. Explicit profit information typically is absent, and consumer inferences about a 
firm's profitability are rarely measured directly. The majority of  experiments described here 
focus more on profit than price. 
The second point of  departure pertains to consumer attributions regarding profits and 
prices. Prior research has emphasized the vendor's motivation for altering the status quo, and 
therefore research on dual entitlement has been dominated by considerations of  perceived 
equity, justice, and ethics (e.g., Bies, Tripp, and Neale 1993; Campbell 1999; Martins and 
Momoe 1994). The present research focuses on cognitive determinants offaimess by 
investigating consumer understanding of  markets, the environment, and the vendor's 
constraints. Our guiding hypothesis is that such knowledge does not exist at high levels 
across the population. Given that consumer knowledge of  explicit and unambiguous retail 
price information can be depressingly low (e.g., Dickson and Sawyer 1990), it seems 
reasonable to expect poor appreciation of  closely guarded cost and profit information. 
Although knowledge of  profits has not been extensively investigated, consumers are not 
highly satisfied with the price-profit relationship they perceive to exist among large firms 
(Business Week, 2000). 
The following experiments are organized around three reference points that should 
affect fairness perceptions: past prices, comparison prices, and the firm's costs. We 
characterize these reference points as looking back (at past prices), looking across (at 
comparison prices), and looking inward (to costs). The latter results are then used to motivate 
a fourth set of  studies that examine differences between products and services that might 
influence perceptions of  fairness. 
LOOKING BACK: PAST PRICES 
We begin with the most straightforward and tractable reference point. As noted, 
Kahneman et al. (1986b) suggest that transaction history can provide one frame of  reference 
for judging fairness. History is typically operationalized in terms of  the price previously 
charged by a particular vendor. In the present studies, we focus on price changes at the industry level by examining the effects of  inflation. We expect that consumers will under-
rather than over-estimate inflationary trends, which in turn will prompt inadequate savings 
behavior, perceptions of  unfair prices, and over-estimation of  seller profits. 
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Evidence suggests that consumers rely on past prices when judging the 
appropriateness of  current prices and use current prices to forecast future prices (Briesch, 
Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar and Raj  1997; Jacobson and Obenniller 1990; Wall Street Journal 
1997). Research also suggests that consumers have a poor understanding of inflation and that 
their estimates of its effects may be biased in the direction of  underestimation (Bates and 
Gabor 1986; Katona 1975; Kemp 1987, 1991). Such results are consistent with 
psychophysical research showing that underestimation is common in trend extrapolation of 
time-series data (e.g., Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975), perhaps due to anchoring effects (cf. 
Harvey and Bolger 1996). 
Pilot Study. A pilot study was conducted to establish the basic phenomenon in a 
pricing context. College students were asked to estimate the annual savings required to pay 
for the cost of  a college education ten years in the future. Thirty-eight participants were given 
the current cost of an education, the inflation rate (manipulated as a between-subjects factor 
to be either 3% or 9%), and the interest rate accrued on savings (manipulated as a within-
subject factor to be either 0% or equal to the inflation rate). As expected, participants 
underestimated the required savings .rate. The proportion of  required savings accrued at the 
end of  ten years was 0.87 and 0.65 in the 3% and 9% conditions, respectively (F(I, 36) = 
6.08, p < .02). Surprisingly, the savings interest rate did not moderate the tendency toward 
underestimation (F < 1). (Many participants apparently believed that saving ten percent of 
the current cost at the rate of  inflation was sufficient.)  It is noteworthy that these results were 
obtained in a context in which sensitivity to, and knowledge of, the problem of  inflation 
should have been high. 
The remaining experiments also use scenarios as stimuli to assess consumer beliefs 
and attitudes. Unless otherwise noted, participants were undergraduate students who received 
course credit in return for their participation. The numbers of  participants are reported in 
tables that accompany each experiment. Experiment 1: Recent versus Remote Prices 
Participants in the pilot study were given a current price and were asked to 
extrapolate. In the present study, current and past prices were provided. Forecast accuracy 
should be higher if  consumers have historical data from which to extrapolate. However, the 
precise nature of  the historical data should have an influence as well. Historical data points 
that best illustrate the shape of  the inflation curve should be most helpful (cf. Wagenaar and 
Timmers 1979). Assuming a constant inflation rate, remote data best reveal the exponential 
nature of  inflation. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in everyday contexts the 
most memorable and salient prices are those that have been observed most recently. 
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Method. Participants were asked to predict the cost of  a college education ten years 
hence. They were given the current price of  a college education ($99,860) and historical 
price information that reflected a constant inflation rate (manipulated as a between-subjects 
factor to be either 3% or 9%). The type of  historical price information provided to 
participants was manipulated as a between-subjects factor at three levels:  "remote" data 
(from ten years ago only), "recent" data (from the previous three years), or both "recent and 
remote" data. The data were computed based on the stated current price and rate of  inflation. 
Results. An analysis was conducted based on the percentage deviations from the 
correct response. A two-way ANOV  A indicated a significant main effect of  inflation rate 
(F(l, 162) = 102.98,p < .001), a significant main effect of  type of  data (F(2, 162) = 3.27,p = 
.04), and a non-significant interaction (F(2, 162) =  1.41,p =  .25). As indicated in table 1, 
prices were uniformly underestimated and were especially inaccurate at the higher inflation 
rate. Moreover, estimates were least accurate when made in the presence of  recent data. A 
planned contrast of  estimates based on "remote" data to "recent" data was significant (F(l, 
162) = 6.55, p = .01). Thus, recent historical price information exacerbates underestimation 
of  inflationary effects. TABLE 1:  EDUCATION COST FORECAST (AS A PROPORTION OF TRUE VALUE) 
Type of  data 
Remote 
Recent 
Recent and remote 
Inflation rate =  3% 
0.97 (0.07) n = 29 
0.95 (0.07) n = 26 
0.95 (0.09) n = 29 
Inflation rate = 9% 
0.81 (0.15) n =  28 
0.71 (0.18) n =  28 
0.78 (0.l3) n =  28 
Note:  Bold estimates are significantly less than 1.00 (all p < .01), indicating 
underestimation. 
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It  is not clear to us that consumers appreciate the benefits of  adopting a longer time 
horizon. We investigated this possibility in a follow-up study. Participants were asked to 
predict the annual cost of  college ten years hence based on a stated current cost and a steady-
state inflation rate for the previous ten years. Before doing so, however, they were given the 
opportunity to view a single price from any of  the preceding ten years. Our objective was to 
assess participants' sensitivity to the salutary effect of  adopting a long time horizon (i.e., to 
search remote prices). Results produced a search distribution that was largely bimodal. Of 
the 85 participants, 42.4% searched for price data from 1-3 years in the past, with the 
majority searching only one year back; an identical percentage searched 8-10 years in the 
past, with the majority searching 10 years back. Insofar as recent data harm predictive 
accuracy, the majority of  participants in this study can be said to search suboptimally. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the potential for "sticker shock" and 
potentially devastating savings behavior. However, they fail to provide direct evidence 
regarding price dissatisfaction or perceptions of  unfairness. In the next experiment we 
examine the case in which consumers are considering a current purchase but have access to 
previous price information and must assess the fairness of  the current price. 
Experiment 2: Current Prices and Perceived Fairness 
Method. Participants were presented with a current and historical price of  a polo shirt 
and were asked to determine whether the increase in price was fair-given that the historical 
price was fair. The experimental design consisted of  three experimental groups (three levels 
of  current price information) and a control group (no current price information). The current price of  the shirt (X) was manipulated at three levels ($34.59, $39.49, or $44.79), where the 
middle price of  $39.49 represented the historical fair price adjusted for inflation. After a 
short introduction, participants read the following: 
.. , Consider the case of  a particular brand of  polo shirt sold by a particular 
department store retailer  ...  , Seven years ago ... the retailer sold this brand 
of  polo shirt to consumers at a fair price of  $23. Since then, inflation and 
quality have forced the manufacturer to raise its price each year. Simply to 
cover these costs, the retailer would need to raise its retail price each year by 
8% over each previous year. If  you go to the store today, the price you will 
see on this polo shirt is $X Based on your fIrst impression, please check one 
of  the three responses below (a, b, or c) and answer the remainder of  the 
question if  necessary. 
a)  I think that the retailer has absorbed some of  the manufacturer's price 
increase. In order to maintain the same fair profIt as in 1989, the retailer 
should raise the price from $X  to $ __  _ 
b)  I think the retailer has neither absorbed any of  the manufacturer's price 
increase nor tried to make extra profIt. Thus, $X  is an appropriate price 
to charge. 
c)  I think the retailer has added to the manufacturer's price increase and is 
trying to make additional profIt. In order to maintain the same fair profIt 
as in 1989, the retailer should lower the price from $Xto $ ___  ' 
A fourth (control) group of  participants was not given a current price but instead was asked 
the open-ended question "what do you think would be a fair price for the retailer to charge 
consumers for this polo shirt today?" 
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Results. A categorical analysis of  the results indicates a propensity to underestimate 
the fair price (see table 2). Among participants provided with a specifIc current price, more 
underestimated inflation (32.3%) than overestimated inflation (15.6%; X2(2) = 34.21, P < 
.001). Similarly, among participants who were asked only for an open-ended response, 
significantly more (61.9%) underestimated than overestimated the fair price (25.4%; X2(2) = 8 
21.27,p < .001). Unsurprisingly, participants' responses in the experimental groups were 
influenced by the current price given (l(4) = 32.47,p < .001). When a low current price was 
given, participants were more likely to underestimate inflation than when a high current price 
was given. Thus, the current retail price appeared to act as an anchor that biased fair price 
estimates toward it. As a result, fair prices estimated by participants increased with the 
current price (F(2, 90) =  20.68, p < .001).1  This response bias is important because it 
suggests that, although participants underestimated the effects of  inflation when 
extrapolating from past prices, their fair price estimates were biased by the current price 
information (i.e., the going rate). 
Moreover, the anchoring effect of  the current price was clearly insufficient to 
completely compensate for perceptions of  unfairness or gouging. Even in a context in which 
the current price was the fair price, more participants underestimated than overestimated 
inflation (19 versus 5 out of63 participants) and by a considerable amount (M= $32.36 VS. a 
true fair price of  $39.42; t(18) = -7.3l,p < .001). Somewhat surprising is that even when 
participants were provided with a very high current price anchor ($44.79) they insufficiently 
adjusted for irIflationary effects. That is, the observed estimate (M  = $36.18) is significantly 
lower than the true value (t(36) = -4.57, p < .001). Thus, perceptions of  price unfairness (i.e., 
that retailers are "gouging") may be particularly susceptible to the effects of  underestimating 
irIflation. 
Discussion 
Taken together, the results suggest that consumers are poor assessors of  the effects of 
irIflation on prices. Future prices that are based on present prices are underestimated, as is the 
appropriateness of  current prices given a historical price. In some ways, the results reported 
here are conservative. The stimuli were explicit, and therefore neither memory for past prices 
nor estimates of  the irIflation rate were subject to self-serving distortion. In addition, the 
stimulus domains were realistic and relevant, and the participants possessed computational 
abilities that are likely to be above the average of  the general population. We speculate that 
1 This analysis includes only participants who judged that the retailer was absorbing or gouging (since only 
these participants were asked to provide their own estimate of  fair price).  The analysis also revealed a main 
effect of  choice (absorbing or gouging; F(I, 90) = 104.73,p < .001), as expected. in most environments in which inflation exists above nominal levels, sticker shock and 
perceptions of  unfairness should be anticipated. 
TABLE 2:  PRICE FAIRNESS AS A FUNCTION OF INFLATION AND CURRENT 
PRICE 
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Current price  Median and range  Absorbing  Correct price  Gouging 
$34.59  35.88  39.67 (4.23) 
(below fair price)  (24.84-50.00)  n ==19 
$39.49  35.00  43.31 (1.56) 
(correct fair price)  (25.00-45.00)  n=5 
$44.79  36.99  51.21 (5.32) 
(above fair price)  (25.00-56.64)  n =3  n = 21 
Open-ended  37.00  38.54 (7.47) 
(25.00-65.00)  n = 63 (39 underestimated, 16 over-estimated) 
Note1:light shading = true response; dark shading = underestimated inflation; no shading 
=  overestimated inflation. 
Note 2: Mean price estimates in bold are significantly different from the correct value (all 
p<.05). 
LOOKING ACROSS: COMPARISON PRICES 
Past prices are neither the only nor dominant influence on price perceptions (Mayhew 
and Winer 1992; Rajendran and Tellis 1994). As Kahneman et al. (1986b) note, prevailing 
competitive prices can serve as the reference transaction, especially when a transaction 
history with a particular vendor does not exist. In commodity markets this "going rate" keeps 
prices low because the vendor has little justification for exceeding it. Evidence oflower 
prices in the marketplace for the same good can engender feelings of  unfaimess that result in 
customer defection (e.g., Frey and Pommerehne 1993; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989). 
In contrast, the issue of  price fairness in noncommodity markets is not often 
addressed. The principle of  dual entitlement suggests that price differences can be justified 
by cost differences, and consumer research suggests that price differences frequently are 10 
interpreted in terms of  quality differences (which, in turn, presumably correspond to cost 
differences). Nonetheless, direct investigation of  perceived fairness is rare, and consumer 
research related to price dispersion often focuses on quality attributions. We do not question 
the reasonableness of  price-quality inferences, particularly in competitive markets. However, 
in the larger environment, many other factors contribute to price and profit. In this and the 
following section we examine consumer understanding of, and reaction to, these factors. In 
most instances we hold product quality constant while assessing (1) attributions consumers 
make regarding the prices and profits of  competing vendors who differ on non-product 
dimensions or (2) reactions to explicit price and profit levels associated with vendors who 
differ on these dimensions. 
Experiment 3: Profit Versus Cost Attributions 
Competing retail stores may sell the same brand but offer different levels of  service 
or convenience, and these different retail tactics may entail different costs or margin 
requirements. The present experiment investigates the effect of  such store differences on 
judgments of  price fairness. By manipulating the explicitness of  differences in retail tactics, 
we assessed whether consumers spontaneously acknowledge store differences. Prior research 
suggests that consumers are somewhat sensitive to store differences (Grewal and Baker 
1994); to our knowledge, however, the extent to which the benefits offered by different 
stores is perceived to offset price differences has not been examined. 
Method. The experiment used a 2 (Store Type) x 2 (Benefit Cue) x 2 (Product 
Replicate) rnixed design. Store type was manipulated on a within-subject basis at two levels: 
inexpensive versus expensive store price image. There were two product replicates 
manipulated on a between-subjects basis: a pint of  ice cream (sold in a grocery or 
convenience store) or clothing (sold in a discount or department store). Thus, participants 
were asked for reactions concerning a pint of  ice cream at a grocery store and convenience 
store or an article of clothing at a discount and a department store. The costslbenefits offered 
by the competing stores (e.g., location, atmosphere, service) were either cued or not cued, 
also between-subjects. After viewing the stimulus, participants were asked to estimate the 11 
actual and fair prices and the profit margins of  each store. For example, the scenario from the 
clothing condition, with the benefit cue shown in [brackets], reads as follows: 
The retail industry is composed of  many types of  stores. Even for stores that 
sell similar merchandise, large differences exist among competing retailers. 
Without mentioning specific examples, most shoppers can name several 
department stores. There are also many discount stores that may sell similar 
clothing (and often sell the same brands). [Department stores tend to offer 
greater selection, more service, and a more pleasant in-store environment.] 
Imagine an identical item sold at both types of  stores. For example, this item 
may be a shirt or blouse or slacks. The same manufacturer sells the item to 
both stores for an identical price. In this instance, imagine that the price is 
$25. On the lines below, please estimate the following: 
1)  How much will each store charge the consumer for the item? 
2)  What do you feel would be a fair price for each store to charge? 
3)  For each dollar that the store takes in at its true prices, how much is left 
over in profit after each store has covered all of  its costs? 
Results. Table 3 indicates an identical pattern of  results for each stimulus replicate 
(analyzed separately due to heterogeneity of  variance in price estimates). As expected, actual 
price estimates were higher for the expensive store than for the inexpensive store (F(I, 21) = 
21.l5,p < .001, for ice cream; F(I, 20) = 100.46,p < .001, for clothing). Similarly, estimates 
of  the fair price were higher for the expensive store than for the inexpensive store (F(I, 21) = 
8.1O,p < .01, for ice cream; F(I, 20) = 24.53,p < .001, for clothing). There were no 
significant effects of  the benefit cue on actual or fair price estimates.2  The higher estimated 
actual and fair prices for the expensive store suggest that participants spontaneously 
acknowledged differences between stores. We surmise that the within-subject manipulation 
of  store comparison made the store differences so salient that the cue had no incremental 
effect. In experiments reported later, cost cues exerted a much larger influence. 
2 For completeness, two (marginal) exceptions are reported.  FOT clothing, neither the benefit cue nor its 
interaction with store type were significant for fair price and actual price estimates (all F < I).  For ice cream, 
the benefit cue marginally reduced actual price (F(l, 21) =  3.00,p =  .10; interaction F < 1) and fair price 
estimates (F(l, 21) = 3.49,p = .08; interaction F(l, 21) = 1.50,p = .23). 12 
More interesting are the profit-related measures. Although participants conceded 
higher prices to the expensive stores, they nonetheless thought that the prices at the 
expensive stores were less fair. The unfair surcharge (actual price minus fair price) was 
greater for the expensive store than for the inexpensive store (F(l, 21) = 20.61,p < .001, for 
ice cream; F(1, 20) =  45.67,p < .001, for clothing). Similarly, profit estimates (per dollar of 
sales) were higher for the expensive store (F(l, 16) = 41.05,p < .001, for ice cream; F(l, 18) 
= 23.29,p < .001, for clothing). The benefit cue again had no effect on either surcharge or 
profit.3 
TABLE 3:  STORE PRICE IMAGE EFFECTS 
Product  Store  N  Fair  Actual  Profit  Surcharge 
price image  price  price  (actual minus 
fair price) 
Ice cream  Grocery  23  3.30  3.64  0.22t  0.35 
(inexpensive)  (0.56)  (0.60)  (0.15)  (0.32) 
Ice cream  Convenience  23  3.46  4.13  0.36:1:  0.66 
(expensive)  (0.76)  (0.86)  (0.19)  (0.34) 
Clothing  Discount  22  32.89  35.14  0.19t  2.25 
(inexpensive)  (6.14)  (5.84)  (0.10)  (4.01) 
Ice cream  Department  22  35.89  44.13  0.32t  8.25 
(expensive)  (6.41)  (8.42)  (0.17)  (4.29) 
t missing profit data from 2 participants. t missing profit data from 5 participants. 
Overall, participants expected prices to differ by store and judged part of  this price 
difference as fair, presumably due to store cost differences inasmuch as the cost of  good sold 
(CGS) was held constant. Cueing the benefits of  each store had no incremental effect. From 
an attribution standpoint, it appears that respondents attributed the expected price differential 
between the expensive and inexpensive store more to profit than to cost. That is, when 
3 Most important, the benefit cue had no effect on profit estimates for clothing or ice cream (all F<I).  The 
benefit cue also had no effect on the surcharge for clothing (F < 1; interaction F(l, 20) = 2.37,p = .14) or ice 
cream (all F < 1). 13 
accounting for the expected difference in actual price, the estimated profit differences 
exceeded the estimated cost differences by a factor of  two (ice cream) to three (clothing). In 
tenns of  an attribution hierarchy, profit attributions dominated store cost attributions. 
The absolute magnitude of  the per-dollar profit estimates also is notable. A result that 
is observed repeatedly in subsequent experiments is that consumers are naIve with respect to 
retail profitability and the opportunity to generate high profit margins in competitive 
marketplaces. Given the high margins estimated by these participants, skepticism regarding 
the fairness of  retail prices is natural. 
Experiment 4: Profit, Cost, and Quality Attributions 
In the preceding experiment, price difference attributions were constrained to profit 
and "service" costs, given that the competing stores offered the same brands. In the present 
experiment we allowed participants to make quality attributions as well by manipulating 
whether the brands in the competing stores were identical. As noted, prior research suggests 
that quality is the default attribution when different brands possess different prices. In a retail 
context, quality competes with profit and other costs as possible attributions. 
Method. The experiment employed a 2 (Department Store versus Discount Store) x 2 
(Same versus Different Product Brand) x 2 (Benefit Cue) mixed design. Participants were 
asked to judge price, CGS, other costs, and profits for a polo shirt at department and discount 
stores. Participants were told that the polo shirt was either the same or a different brand at 
each store; some participants were also cued to think about store differences (including other 
cost differences). The stimulus frame was as follows: 
You are out shopping one day for a polo shirt. You visit a department store. 
While there, you see a polo shirt. Later the same day, you visit a discount 
store. [While there, you see the exact same polo shirt (same brand, same 
style, same fabric and color, etc.). / While there, you see another polo shirt 
(a different brand).]  [You also notice that the department store has more 
selection and service, as well as a more pleasant in-store environment (compared to the discount store). / omit]  For each store, please estimate the 
following: 
What is the price you pay for the 
polo shirt in each store? 
a)  How much of  the price you 
pay does the store use to pay 
the manufacturer for the item? 
b)  How much of  the price you 
pay goes to cover other costs 
that the store has? 
c)  How much of  the price you 
pay is left over as profit made 





Very  Very 




How fair do you think the store's 
price is? 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  123 4  5  6  7 
Results. For simplicity of  presentation, table 4 presents the mean difference scores 
between the department and discount store for each dependent measure. The results are 
collapsed across benefit cue because benefit cue again exerted no effect.4  As expected, 
estimates for the total price of  the polo shirt were higher in the department store than the 
discount store (F(l, 92) = 406.6, p < .001) but did not vary by condition. Also as expected, 
estimates for CGS depended on the store (F(l, 92) = 65.53,p < .001) and its interaction with 
brand (F(l, 92) = 7.08,p < .01). CGS estimates were larger for department than discount 
stores, especially when the stores carried different brands. Regardless of  whether the stores 
carried identical or different brands, estimates for other costs were higher for department 
4 A lone (marginal) exception was that the fairness advantage of  discount stores over department stores was 
reduced when store differences were cued (F(I, 90) =  3.68,p =  .06). 15 
stores than discount stores (F(l, 92) = 83.7,p < .001), as were profit estimates (F(l, 92) = 
164.3,p < .001) in absolute dollars. Further, the differences in perceived fairness 
corresponded to differences in perceived profits: higher prices and profits were associated 




TABLE 4: COST AND PROFIT ATTRIBUTIONS 
(DEPARTMENT MINUS DISCOUNT STORE) 
N  CGS  Other  Profit  Price  %Profit 
51  6.97  4.45  9.07  20.49  2.10 
(6.60)  (4.51)  (5.68)  (8.95)  (12.02) 
45  3.47  4.36  11.56  19.38  8.13 
(5.92)  (4.82)  (9.68)  (10.22)  (12.09) 






In terms of  the attribution hierarchy, the results are straightforward. When stores 
carry the same brand (as in experiment 3), the large expected price difference between the 
department and discount stores was attributed first to profit and then to other costs, with 
again an almost three times greater allocation to profit. The directional result was expected, 
inasmuch as CGS was held constant. When stores carried different brands and a quality 
attribution was possible, profit again was dominant. However, quality (CGS) dominated 
other costs. These results are noteworthy in light of  our discussion regarding prior research 
on fairness. It  is apparent that consumers readily make price-quality inferences. However, the 
overall situation may be more nuanced in ways that have significant implications for 
perceived fairness. Although participants attributed a portion of  the price difference to the 
cost of  quality, they nonetheless attributed an even greater portion to differences in the 
profits of  the competing vendors. 
Finally, an interesting effect is observed when profit is converted to a percentage of 
price. Overall, percentage profits were quite large (around 40%)-and larger in the 
department store than discount store (F(l, 92) =  16.95,p < .001). Moreover, this difference 
in percentage profit was greater for same brands than different brands (F(l, 92) = 5.83, p = 
.02). Indeed, when quality attributions were possible with different brands, the department 16 
and discount stores were viewed as generating the same percentage profit (t( 50) = 1.25, p > 
.10). This result is noteworthy when considered in the context of  the fairness ratings. 
Fairness was viewed as unifonnlyhigher at the discount store (F(l, 90) =  153.7,p < .001). 
Thus, when quality attributions were possible, it seems that judgments were driven more by 
the absolute profit differences (almost double for department versus discount stores) than the 
percentage profit differences (which were negligible). The dual entitlement principle 
proposes that sellers are entitled to a reference profit but is silent with respect to whether 
consumers make finer distinctions concerning absolute versus percentage profits when 
assessing fairness. A failure to relate fairness to percentage profit differences could be due to 
several factors, including the use of  a naIve cost-plus-absolute-profit rule or a naIve 
understanding of  retail accounting that must incorporate variables such as inventory turnover. 
The next several experiments pursue these possibilities. 
Experiment 5: Not AU Equal Profits Are Equally Fair 
In experiments 3 and 4, the profit question was open-ended to allow respondents the 
opportunity to express their beliefs and make attributions. In the present studies, respondents 
were informed that the competing retailers generated identical net profit margins but arrived 
at those profits in different ways that were largely dictated by forces beyond the retailers' 
control. The question is whether consumers take into account the retailers' constraints when 
judging fairness. Two pilot studies were first run to gauge consumer sentiment. 
Pilot Studies. These experiments examined whether consumers are influenced by the 
vendors' ability to generate profit from high margins versus high inventory turnover. Two 
stores that differed in tumover and margin were described. In the first pilot, the presence of a 
product-quality rationale for the difference was manipulated. Specifically, participants read 
the following information. The quality explanation provided to some participants is included 
in [brackets.] 
We are interested in your views on store [mances. As you know, stores make 
a profit from selling goods. Overall profit is a function of  many factors, 
including "stockturn'" and "markon."  "Stocktum" is the number of  times the store's inventory is sold in a year (i.e., the turnover rate). "Markon" is the 
percentage amount of  the retail price on an item over and above cost (i.e., the 
markup or gross margin). Some stores have relatively low stockturn and a 
high markon. In contrast, other stores have relatively high stockturn but a 
lower markon. Many factors detennine stocktum and markon. Markon is 
often based on traditional store practice. A store may use a standard markup 
on all goods, with only a few exceptions. Stockturn is influenced by the nature 
of  the goods sold by the store. [For example, some stores sell higher quality 
goods. These goods cost more to manufacture so they are priced higher. 
Higher-priced goods tend to sell less quickly. Hence, stockturn is lower and 
stores charge a higher markon to make their profit. On the other hand, other 
stores sell lower quality goods. These goods cost less, are priced lower, and 
tend to sell more quickly. Hence stockturn is higher and stores charge a lower 
markon to make their profit.] 
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Participants were asked to write down examples of stores with high and low stockturn in the 
same category. They were then presented with information about two stores' finances. Store 
A was described as having a stockturn of  2 and a markon of  50% and Store B as having a 
stock  -turn of  5 and a markon of  20%. The net profit margin at both stores was stated to be 
5%. Based on this information, participants then rated the fairness of  each store on a 7-point 
scale. 
As the results in table 5 indicate, fairness ratings were significantly different across 
stores (F(l, 41) = 1O.09,p < .001). Providing a quality explanation had no effect (F < 1) . 
Thus, despite equal and low net margins and a reasonable justification for margin 
differences, respondents gave higher fairness ratings to the store (B) with higher stockturn 
and lower markon. 18 
TABLE 5:  FAIRNESS RATINGS AS A FUNCTION OF STORE TURNOVER 
PRACTICES 
Store  Stock- Mark- Net profit  Fairness rating 
turn  on  margin  Quality explanation  No quality explanation 
N=22  N=2l 
Store A  2  50%  5%  4.00 (l.48)  4.24 (1.97) 
Store B  5  20%  5%  5.23 (0.92)  5.05 (1.60) 
It  could be argued that although participants recognized the quality differences, the 
markon difference was too large to justify for goods from the same product class. We 
conducted a second study in which the goods in the competing stores were left unspecified 
but were implied as coming from different product classes (i.e., durable versus nondurable) 
rather than quality. As before, respondents wrote down examples of stores with high and low 
stockturn and then were presented with infonnation about two stores' finances in which the 
stockturns and markons were unchanged from the first pilot study. Margin was described as 
identical at each store but the exact level was either unspecified or set at the low level of 
3.5%. 
Results showed that the difference in perceived fairness between stores was again 
significant (F(1, 72) = 22.37,p < .001) and that explicitly stating net margin had no effect (F 
< 1). Higher fairness was ascribed to the store with higher stockturn and lower markon (4.85 
versus 3.76). Inspection of  protocols showed that the majority of  respondents (79%) 
instantiated the stores in terms of  different product categories (e.g., grocery versus furniture 
store). Even when restricted to these respondents, the low stockturn store was perceived as 
less fair (t(52) = 4.05, p < .001). 
These pilot studies indicate that consumers take into account how finns' profits are 
made when judging price fairness. Consumers judged stores with higher markups and lower 
turnover as less fair, even when store turnover arose from factors beyond store control (e.g., 
nature of  the goods sold) and net profit was explicitly low. In the main experiment that 
follows we examine other sources of  price variation across stores, including the finn's 19 
marketing strategies and pricing constraints. Some strategies are primarily determined 
endogenously. For example, Nike has chosen to follow a promotion-heavy strategy. In a 
similar vein, some retailers incur higher costs (e.g., by providing better service or carrying 
riskier inventory) that are passed on to customers in the form of  higher prices. At the 
extreme, stores may choose to follow a margin versus volume strategy and price accordingly. 
Other strategies may be determined primarily by exogenous factors. For example, fIrms with 
a narrow customer base due to geography will suffer lower turnover and therefore must 
charge higher prices to make a profIt. 
We presented price differences between two stores and attributed these differences to 
various factors (i.e., product quality, non-CGS costs, customer base, inventory risk, and 
margin/volume strategy). Based on the pilot results, we hypothesized that price differences 
not exclusively attributable to quality (such as other costs and risk) would be seen as unfair. 
We also expected that prices based on an intentional high-margin strategy would be judged 
as less fair than prices based on unavoidable constraints faced by the fIrm. The more 
interesting but less predictable result concerns the precise way in which these latter fIrms are 
viewed. 
Method. Participants were given prices for blouses at two stores. At Store A, the 
blouse was priced at $29.95; at store B, the blouse was priced at $39.95. Overall costs and 
net profit were held constant. Respondents were then given an explanation (manipulated at 5 
levels) for the price difference and asked to assess the fair price of  the blouse at each store. In 
all conditions, the explanation began as follows: 
We are interested in your views, as a consumer, on the fairness of  store 
[mances and pricing. As you know, stores make a profit from selling goods 
and overall profIt is a function of  many factors. Consider the case of  two 
stores. 
In the quality explanation condition, the scenario attributed the higher price at Store B 
to quality. It  controlled for other store differences by equating service and other costs, overall 
revenue, and net profIt as follows: Both stores have the same level of  service and other costs, the same overall 
sales revenue, and the same net profit. Both stores sell blouses. Store A 
charges $29.95; Store B charges $39.95. Store A charges a lower price 
because it carries a lower quality blouse. The store pays less to the 
manufacturer for the blouse; as a result, the same markup leads to a lower 
price than in Store B. Store B carries a higher quality blouse. The store pays 
the manufacturer more for this blouse; with the same markup as Store A, its 
prices are higher. 
20 
In the other cost condition, the scenario attributed the higher price at Store B to other 
costs. It controlled for other store differences by equating quality, sales revenue, and net 
profit as follows: 
Both stores have the same overall sales revenue and the same net profit. Both 
stores sell the exact same blouse (same brand, same quality, same style, same 
cost paid to the manufacturer). Store A charges $29.95; Store B charges 
$39.95. Store A charges a lower price because its other costs (service, admin, 
rent, etc.) are lower. (For example, it offers less service, rent is lower in its 
location, etc.)  Store B charges a higher price because it has to cover higher 
other costs. (For example, it offers better service, has higher rental costs in its 
location, etc.). As a result, Store B has to charger a higher price to make the 
same profit as Store A. 
In the risk condition, the scenario attributed the higher price at Store B to risky 
inventory. It controlled for other store differences by equating service, quality, sales revenue, 
and net profit as follows: 
Both stores have the same level of  service, the same costs and overall sales 
revenue, and the same net profit. Both stores sell blouses of  the same quality 
and pay the same cost to their manufacturers. Store A charges $29.95; Store B 
charges $39.95. Store A charges a lower price because it faces less risk that it 
will not able to sell its inventory. Store B carries riskier inventory. (For 
example, its blouses may be seasonal or very fashion-forward or from new/unknown designers or manufacturers.) As a result, it faces more risk that it 
will not be able to sell its inventory and will have to dump blouses at the end of 
the season. Store B covers this risk by charging higher prices for the same 
quality goods than Store A. 
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In the customer base condition, the scenario attributed the higher price at Store B to a 
narrow customer base due to geography. It  controlled for other store differences by equating 
service, quality, sales revenue and net profit as follows: 
Both stores have the same level of  service, the same costs and overall sales 
revenue, and the same net profit. Both stores sell the exact same blouse (same 
brand, same quality, same style). Store A charges $29.95; Store B charges 
$39.95. Store A charges a lower price because it has a broad customer base 
due to its geography. The broad customer base results in higher turnover so 
Store A can charge lower prices to make the same profit as Store B. Store B, 
with its narrow customer base due to its geography, has lower turnover so 
must charge higher prices to make the same profit. 
In the marginlvolume strategy condition, the scenario attributed the price difference 
to a high margin strategy at Store B and a volume strategy at Store A. It  controlled for other 
store differences by equating service, quality, sales revenue and net profit as follows: 
Both stores have the same level of  service, the same costs and overall sales 
revenue, and the same net profit. Both stores sell the exact same blouse (same 
brand, same quality, same style). Store A charges $29.95; Store B charges 
$39.95. Store A charges a lower price because it follows a "volume strategy". 
It charges a lower price, which increases sales; with a lower margin per sale 
but higher volume of  sales, it makes the same profit as Store B. Store B, 
following a "margin strategy", charges a higher price; its lower volume of 
sales is offset by a higher margin in order to make the same profit. 22 
Following presentation of  the scenario, participants were shown a table summarizing the 
main points of  the scenario and asked to generate an estimate of  the fair price at each store as 
follows (shown here for the quality condition only): 
Please take a moment to consider these stores. What do you think is a fair 
price at each store?  (Enter a $ amount for each store.) 
Quality  Net Profit on  Price Charged  Fair Price 
Overall Revenue*  For Blouse 
Store A  Lower  5%  $29.95  $ 
Store B  Higher  5%  $39.95  $ 
* Note:  Both stores have the same revenue so make the same profit whether 
expressed in $ or %. 
Results. An ANOVA conducted on the differences in fair-price estimates revealed a 
significant omnibus effect of  condition (F(4, 92) = 6.92,p < .001). Recall that the store 
prices differed by $10; if  participants accepted the explanation for the price difference, their 
estimates would also differ by $10. As the pattern of  means in table 6 reveals, a quality 
explanation for price differences led to fair prices that differed by approximately $10 (t(lS) = 
l.12;p = .l4). In all other conditions, the fair price differences were less than $10 (all p's < 
.01); that is, participants did not fully accept the non-quality explanations provided for store 
price differences. As expected, a planned contrast of  the quality condition against the other 
cost, risk and customer base conditions was significant (F(l, 92) = lS.41,p < .001), 
indicating that the latter explanations were less acceptable than a quality explanation. In 
addition, a planned contrast of  the margin/volume strategy condition to the non-quality 
conditions indicates that non-quality explanations are as unacceptable as an intentional 
margin strategy explanation (F(l, 92) = 2.37, p = .13). 23 
TABLE 6:  STORE FAIRNESS DIFFERENCES 
AS A FUNCTION OF  MARKETING STRATEGY EXPLANATION 
Marketing Strategy  N  Fair Price Difference (Store B minus Store A) 
Quality  19  10.79 (3.08) 
t(18) =  1.12,p =  .14 
Customer Base  20  6.95 (4.25) 
t(19) = 3.21, P =  .002 
Risk  19  5.79 (4.29) 
t(18) = 4.28, p < .001 
Other Costs  19  5.00 (5.14) 
t(18) = 4.24,p < .001 
Margin/Volume Strategy  20  4.20 (4.47) 
t(19) = 5.80,p < .001 
Note:  Means in bold are significantly different from $10. 
As expected, consumers were willing to grant a higher price in return for 
commensurate quality. Also, consumers were least willing to grant a higher price driven by 
the firm's optional and endogenously driven strategy to make profits via high margins rather 
than high volume. Perhaps most interesting are the remaining conditions, which gravitated 
more toward the latter than the former. Even when a higher price resulted from factors 
beyond the firm's control, consumers were unwilling to grant the entire amount required by 
the firm to compete. For example, participants in the Risk condition were unwilling to accept 
the same high price as participants in the Quality condition even though (  a) the overall 
profits at the high priced store in each condition were equal, (b) the overall profits at the high 
priced store in each condition were equal to each store's lower priced competitor, (c) the 
absolute profit margins were low, and (d) the reason for the higher price was beyond the 
firm's control. Inventory risk at a fashion store is a "cost of  doing business." 
Taken together, these experiments suggest that consumers may take into account how 
stores obtain their profit when judging fairness. The dual entitlement principle states that 
sellers are entitled to a reference profit, but it does not speak to how firms may obtain that 
profit. Apparently, not all equal profits are equally fair. 24 
LOOKING INWARD: INTERNAL COSTS 
Aside from reference transactions, the perceived fairness of a price is likely to be 
influenced by the perceived cost of  a good to the vendor (cf. Thaler 1985). Experiments 3 
and 4 showed that, although participants were not indifferent to the costs incurred by 
different types of  retailers, estimated profits of  retailers were quite high and estimated non-
CGS costs were relatively low. Experiment 5 showed that participants were more inclined to 
accept quality or CGS explanations than other explanations when comparing retail prices. 
Insofar as CGS is the most salient cost, other costs may be ignored and overall profits may be 
overestimated. Such an outcome would hold even in the presence of  reference transactions 
once the effect of  price change is removed. That is, even when a price change is deemed fair, 
the absolute price may nonetheless be perceived as too high given the perceived profits of  the 
firm. The results reported by Kahneman et al. (1986b) suggest that consumers are sensitive to 
unchanging costs in the face of  a price increase. An obvious question concerns the extent to 
which costs-and different categories of  costs-are considered spontaneously in jUdging 
prices. 
Experiment 6: Cueing a Salient Cost 
An exploratory study examined the effect of  cueing a seemingly salient cue on profit 
estimates for retail stores. Specifically, we asked participants to estimate CGS, other costs, 
and profit while manipulating whether labor was identified as a separate cost category. 
Method. Participants were presented with the name of  a retail store and were asked to 
estimate various cost categories. A between-subjects store replicate manipulation was used 
for generalizability. The replicates were a department store (Burdines), a discount store 
(Walmart), a specialty store (Limited), and a grocery store (publix), all of  which were local 
to the participant population. A sample stimulus scenario using the Publix replicate in the 
cued condition is reproduced below. The cueing manipulation consisted of  isolating labor as 
a separate line item in the cued condition and omitting any mention oflabor in the uncued 
condition. Weare interested in your impressions of  finances at a retail store. The 
store is Publix. We would like your estimate of  the proportion of 
Publix's revenue that goes to cover cost of  goods sold, the proportion 
that goes to cover labor costs, the proportion that goes to cover all 
remaining costs, and how much is left as Publix's profit (before taxes). 
(Cost of  goods sold refers to the money the store pays to its suppliers 
for the goods it sells. Labor refers to the money the store spends to pay 
its employees.)  On the lines below you see a simplified version of  a 
Publix income statement. Consider one dollar of  revenue. What is your 
estimate of  how much of  each dollar in sales is allocated to each of 
these categories? 
Cost of  Goods Sold: 
Labor Costs: 




Results. As shown in table 7, profit estimates were high but also varied across 
replicates (F(3,336) = 4.22, p < .01). Following the logic of  fault trees (Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1978), there should be no effect of  cueing labor on profit estimates because 
labor costs should be deducted entirely from total other costs. Overall, cueing labor reduced 
profit estimates (F(1, 336) = 5.16,p = .02), suggesting that participants did not 
spontaneously take labor costs fully into account when estimating profits. As expected, other 
costs did decline when labor was cued (F(1, 336) =  138.78, p < .001), although insufficiently 
to account for the full amount oflabor cost estimates. Instead, a portion oflabor costs was 
also deducted from CGS (F(1, 336) = 6.53,p = .01). Whereas CGS varied as a function of 
the store (F(3, 336) = 4.43, p < .01), other costs did not (F(3, 336) =  1.14, p = .33). As we 
also saw in experiments 3 and 4, consumers are more likely to infer quality differences than 
cost differences between stores. 26 
TABLE 7:  JUDGING CGS, OTHER COSTS AND PROFITS FOR STORES (OUT OF $1) 
Store  N  Labor  CGS  Labor  Other  Profit 
Cued  Cost 
Burdines  40  Yes  32.38  22.90  13.93  30.80 
(17.81)  (11.81)  (7.62)  (15.22) 
Burdines  44  No  41.57  27.70  30.73 
(16.64)  (13.92)  (15.33) 
Limited  42  Yes  32.29  23.36  16.90  27.45 
(11.95)  (9.12)  (8.83)  (15.81) 
Limited  44  No  36.68  31.45  31.86 
(16.55)  (14.80)  (17.70) 
Wal-Mart  40  Yes  38.05  22.20  13.80  25.95 
(17.05)  (8.96)  (7.76)  (17.83) 
Wal-Mart  44  No  39.45  29.52  31.02 
(17.13)  (14.10)  (15.56) 
Publix  47  Yes  41.62  24.28  14.21  19.89 
(18.00)  (11.32)  (8.88)  (14.54) 
Publix  43  No  45.47  28.51  26.02 
(20.23)  (12.41)  (14.50) 
Overall, participants' understanding of  retail costs seemed malleable, but perceptions 
of  profit were high and somewhat finn. Their judgments may best be described as quasi-
rational. Labor costs were not fully taken into account, as indicated by the reduction in 
profits when labor was cued. Moreover, CGS estimates were reduced when labor was cued-
suggesting a certain stickiness to profit perceptions. 
Experiment 7: Generalization to the Population 
Although the participants in the preceding experiment were relatively sophisticated 
vis-a-vis the general population, another overture to external validity was made by seeking 
replication through a probability sample of  adults. Prior research suggests that fairness 27 
estimates may vary across populations (Gorman and Kehr 1992). Although the survey format 
precluded exact replication, the survey questions were able to capture the basic intent of 
experiment 6. 
As part of  a larger survey, respondents were asked to answer a single question 
regarding profits and fair prices for several familiar store types and products. Table 8 
describes the exact wording of  the questions posed across respondents, the size of  the sample 
for each question, and the mean responses. 
Results. Overall, the results closely corresponded to the results from the laboratory 
study. Respondents showed some good but mostly bad intuitions. The perceived non-sale 
markup for clothing items at a department store approaches 100%, and respondents estimated 
a $76.58 price for an item that had a $40.00 CGS. On the other hand, the estimated fair price 
was $58.16 and increased only nominally when the store's labor costs were cued. One 
speculation is that shoppers peg their fair price on the reduced price they commonly observe 
during sale periods (cf. Kahneman et al. 1986b), with the logic that the store should always 
sell at the reduced price if  it can occasionally sell at the reduced price. 
The questions concerning overall profitability again show a lack of appreciation for 
market dynamics and competition. Although estimates declined nominally with the average 
price of  goods at each of  three store types, overall profit estimates were extreme. For 
example, the profit eamed by grocery stores is commonly cited at 1_2%.5  It  appears that 
people do not spontaneously or fully appreciate retailer costs when judging fair prices. Profit 
is viewed as constituting a large proportion of  the selling price. These results are consistent 
with experiments 3 and 4 in which profit dominated other attributions for the expected price 
differences at expensive and inexpensive stores. 
5 Grocery stores reported 1.18% net profit after taxes in  1999-2000 (Food Marketing Institute Aug 2001). 28 
TABLE 8:  PRICE AND PROFIT PROBABILITY SAMPLE 
Question  N  Mean  SD 
If  a fancy department store pays $40 to a 
manufacturer for a woman's blouse, what would  593  $58.16  $17.12 
be a fair price for the store to charge you? 
If  a fancy department store pays $40 to a 
manufacturer for a woman's blouse, what would  524  $62.94  $21.87 
be a fair price for the store to charge you, keeping 
in mind the store must cover such costs as rent 
and payroll? 
If  a fancy department store pays $40 to a 
manufacturer for a woman's blouse, how much do  491  $76.58  $33.78 
you think the store charges you for the blouse 
when it is not on sale? 
For each $100 a fancy department store makes in 
sales, how many dollars do you think are left over  775  $33.09  $29.18 
in pure profit after the store has covered all its 
costs? 
... for a discount store ...  538  $30.24  $29.36 
... for a grocery store  ...  671  $27.52  $20.52 
The method used in experiments 6 and 7, which involved cueing cost categories and 
asking for cost and profit estimates, can be viewed as an additive decomposition task. The 
[mdings from the fault-tree literature suggest that additive decomposition can assist people in 
quantitative estimation-if  the decomposition is a correct representation of  the problem. In 
other words, the main benefit of  additive algorithms is that they cue relevant information and 
provide a structure for the estimation task. Although unsurprising, the difficulty that people 
experience in generating correct algorithms is considerable. In the following studies we 
examine the effect of  providing more detailed cost cues on profit estimates. In experiment 8 we assess the effect of  broadening the number of  cost categories; in experiment 9 the depth 
of  a particular cost category is manipulated. 
Experiment 8: Cueing Many Categories 
Method. This experiment used a 2 (Cost Categories) x 2 (Sales Price) between-
subjects design. Cost categories were manipulated at two levels; participants were given 
either a long list of  cost categories or merely the CGS (pegged at $20). Sales price was also 
manipulated at two levels; participants were either provided the sales price of  a woman's 
blouse or not. Participants were asked to provide numerical estimates for costs (including a 
catch-all "other" category) and profit. The scenario for the long-list, price-given condition 
read as follows: 
Weare interested in your impressions of  [mances at a department 
store such as Burdines or Dillards. As an example, we ask you to 
consider a typical product sold at these stores, namely women's 
blouses. Listed below you will see the retail price of  a particular 
blouse along with the cost paid by the store to the manufacturer for 
the item (known as the cost of  goods sold). You will also see a 
general cost category that refers to all other costs the store needs to 
cover in order to stay in business, along with the category of  profit. 
Please think about the categories that are not specified. Your task is 
to fill in the blank lines with dollar amounts. That is, given that the 
retail price is $40 and it cost the store $20 to purchase the blouse, 
how much of  the difference do you estimate is typically allocated to 
the other costs and to profit?  The sum ofthe costs and profit should 
equal the retail price. 






All Other Costs: 
Profit: 
Retail Price:  $40.00 
Results. Providing a long list of  cost categories helped moderate profit perceptions 
(see table 9). Total costs increased when more costs were cued (F(l, 58) = 6.89,p = .01), 
indicating that consumers tend to ignore costs unless they are explicitly given. Absolute 
profit levels declined when a longer list of  cost categories was cued, especially when the 
sales price was given (F(l, 58) = 4.41, p = .04). The same pattern of  results is evident when 
profit is calculated as a percentage of  price (F(l, 58) =  13.39,p < .001). The highest absolute 
and percentage profit levels occurred when participants were not given a price and few costs 
were cued; the lowest levels occurred when a $40 sales price was given and many costs were 
cued. These results obtain in part because participants estimated the actual price to be higher 
than $40 when the price was not explicit. As a result, absolute profit estimates were 
correspondingly higher when participants provided their own price estimate (F(l, 58) = 4.70, 
P =  .03); in other words, participants believed that stores greatly markup prices (more than 
1  00%) and attributed the higher price to higher profits rather than higher costs. Any 
adjustment for cueing costs was grossly insufficient. Moreover, profits appeared to be 
somewhat sticky, inasmuch as percentage profits were similarly high (30% and 32%) when 
few costs were cued. 31 
TABLE 9:  PROFIT AS A FUNCTION OF CUEING MANY CATEGORIES 
Sales price  List of  cost  N  Price $  Other  Profit $  Profit (as 
categories  costs $  % of  price) 
Given ($40)  Short  16  40.00  8.13  11.88  30 
(  --)  (3.96)  (3.96)  (10) 
Given ($40)  Long  16  40.00  12.63  7.38  18 
(--)  (4.38)  (4.38)  (11) 
Not given  Short  15  45.60  10.37  15.23  32 
(13.79)  (8.88)  (8.82)  (11) 
Not given  Long  15  46.76  14.76  12.00  23 
(16.14)  (8.23)  (10.11)  (12) 
Experiment 9: Cueing Detailed Costs 
The previous study examined the effects of  cueing a range of  cost categories; this 
study focuses on depth within a category. Prior research on fault trees has found mixed 
effects of  cueing detail within a category (e.g., Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein 1978; Van 
Schie and van der Pligt 1990). The present experiment used a three-group design. Cue type 
was manipulated at three levels; participants either received no specific cue, a labor cue, or a 
detailed labor cue. In addition to their cued cost category, participants were asked to estimate 
CGS, other costs, profit, and fairness. The detailed labor version scenario read as follows: On the lines below, you see a simplified version of  a major department store's 
income statement. Consider one dollar of  revenue. What is your estimate of 
how much of  each dollar in sales is allocated to each of  these categories? 
Cost of  Goods Sold 
(money paid to suppliers for goods sold in the store) 
Cost of  Labor 
•  Salaries and commissions paid to full-time sales associates 
•  Salaries and bonuses paid to managers 
•  Salaries paid to other staff 
•  All other labor costs 
All Other Costs 
Profits 
Total  $1.00 
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Results. As expected, labor estimates increased with additional detail in the labor cue 
(F(l, 90) =  12.99, P < .001). As table 10 indicates, cueing general labor reduced other cost 
estimates (F(l, 134) = 22.16,p < .001), as did the detailed labor cue (F(l, 134) = 38.18,p < 
.001). The general labor cue did not significantly reduce profits, compared to the no-cue 
control group, although the means are directional (F(l, 134) =  1.54,p > .20). However, a 
detailed labor cue did reduce profit estimates significantly (F(1, 134) =  18.16,p < .001). 
Mirroring profit changes, fairness judgments were unaffected by the general labor cue (F<l) 
but were higher compared to the no-cue control group when additional detail was provided 
(F(l, 133) = 6.38, P = .01). These results suggest that participants may have partially but 
spontaneously taken labor into account when jUdging profits and fairness. Interestingly, 
cueing general labor also reduced CGS estimates compared to the control group (F(l, 134) = 5.86, p = .02), although the incremental effect of  detail was only directional (F(l, 134) = 
2.56,p = .11). 
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A trend analysis was also conducted. Labor cueing produced a linear effect on profit 
(F(1, 134) = 18.16, p < .001) and fairness ratings (F(l, 133) = 6.38,p = .01). In other words, 
profit estimates declined and fairness estimates rose as the labor cue became more explicit. 
Total costs also rose linearly with cueing (F(l, 134) = 51.55, p < .001), although not by the 
full amount of  labor estimated. It is interesting to note that participants "borrowed" from 
both the "other" category (linear F(I, 134) =  38.18,p < .001; quadratic F(1, 134) = 3.66,p = 
.06) and CGS (F(I, 134) = 5.38,p = .02) in accounting for labor costs. The significant 
quadratic effect was due to less borrowing from CGS when detailed labor cues were 
provided. One interpretation of  this latter result is that participants were fmally more willing 
to extract the costs of  labor from profit only when the details of  labor costs to the firm were 
made very explicit. 
TABLE 10:  CUEING DETAILED COSTS 
CUE  No Cue  Labor Cue  Detailed Labor Cue 
N  45  45  47 
CGS  36.4 (14.4)  28.9 (13.4)  33.8 (16.0) 
Other Costs  22.1 (12.4)  13.3 (17.1)  10.7 (5.7) 
Cued Costs  21.0 (10.3)  29.2 (11.5) 
Profit  41.5 (18.6)  37.0 (17.2)  26.3 (15.3) 
Fairness  3.8 (1.2)  4.0 (1.2)  4.4 (1.1) 
These results demonstrate several points. First, as we have seen before, participants 
do not always respond appropriately to cueing of  costs. If  they had, estimates of  CGS would 
not have declined and profits would have held steady when general labor was cued. On the 
other hand, participants were not completely intransigent. Detailed cueing prompted a more 
accurate reallocation of  costs and profit, albeit not nearly to the extent necessary. Also, as 
reported in experiment 4, fairness judgments declined as profit estimates increased. In 
combination, it appears that buyers' perceptions of  costs, profits, and fairness are susceptible 34 
to influence. However, the intervention required may not be realistic. It  is unlikely that fIrms 
would attempt to cue costs to the extent used in this and the preceding experiment. Even if 
they were to do so, our results suggest that profIt estimates are sticky and would remain 
stubbornly high. 
Experiment 10: Not All Costs Are Equal 
The research thus far is equivocal with regard to the question of  spontaneity. On the 
one hand, the lack of  the general labor cue effects in experiment 9 suggests that labor may be 
considered spontaneously-at least in the context of  an explicit decomposition task. On the 
other hand, profIt estimates can be moderated by an unrealistically heavy-handed version of 
the labor cue. Leaving aside the fact that consumers are rarely faced with a decomposition 
task and therefore are less likely to be mindful of  the fIrm's costs in the real world, the 
question of  spontaneity of  non-labor costs remains. Of  all non-CGS costs, labor intuitively 
seems most salient. In this study we examine the effects of  different cost cues using a 
repeated-measures design. We selected three categories: labor (a large category that is 
intuitively salient), rent (a smaller cost category that seems unlikely to be spontaneously 
taken into account by participants), and markdowns (an important practice in store pricing 
that affects profits but also seems unlikely to be considered spontaneously). The experiment 
used a 3 (Cue:  labor vs. rent vs. markdowns) x 2 (Repeated Judgment:  before and after 
cueing) mixed design. The initial scenario read as follows: 
Weare interested in your impression of  fInances at a major department 
store. We would like your estimate of  the proportion of  department store 
revenue that goes to cover cost of  good sold (money paid to suppliers for 
goods sold in the store), the proportion that goes to cover all other 
remaining costs, and how much is left as profit (after taxes). On the lines 
below, you see a simplifIed version of  a major department store's income 
statement. Consider one dollar of  store revenue. What is your estimate of 
how much of  each dollar in sales is allocated to each of  these categories? 35 
Cost of  Good Sold: 
All Other Costs: 
Profits: 
Total:  $1.00 
After estimating these categories, participants provided fairness ratings (on a 1-7 scale). The 
repeat judgment (in the rent cue condition) was elicited as follows: 
One cost that stores have is the cost of  property leases (rent paid on 
buildings leased for store use). You mayor may not have taken property 
leases and other costs fully into account as part of  the "All Other Cost" 
category in your previous estimate of  a department store's finances. On the 
lines below, you see another version of  a major department store's income 
statement. This statement breaks out property lease costs separately from all 
other costs. Consider one dollar of  store revenue. What is your estimate of 
how much of  each dollar in sales is allocated to each of  these categories? 
Other participants were prompted to consider "the cost of  markdowns (price reductions used 
to move merchandise)" or "the cost oflabor (salaries, commissions and bonuses paid to 
associates, managers and other staff)."  After the rent, labor,.or markdown cue, participants 
estimated CGS, the cued category, other costs, and profit, and then re-judged price fairness. 
Results. As expected, all three of  the cues increased estimates ofnon-CGS costs (non-
zero t-tests are all significant, as reported in table 11). Estimates of  CGS declined as a 
function of  cost cue (F(2, 56) = 2.90, p = .06):  participants (illogically) reduced CGS after 
labor and rent but not after markdown cueing. Regardless of  cue, profit estimates were again 
quite high, ranging from 33-40%. Profit estimates declined as a function of  cost cueing (F(2, 
56) = 4.19, P = .02), with larger reductions observed after cueing markdown and rent than 
labor. Fairness ratings also rose after cueing markdowns and rent but not labor. 
Considering the cues separately, labor showed the now-expected pattern. A labor cue 
produced no change in profit but did produce a decline in CGS. Thus, while acknowledging 
the labor cost, participants were more prone to reduce variable costs than profit. In the cases 36 
of  rent and markdowns, however, there was less borrowing from CGS and a consequent 
lowering of  profit estimates. These results demonstrate that non-obvious categories are not 
generated spontaneously and that cueing of  such costs does produce a reasonably rational 
reaction in terms of  CGS and profit estimates. From a methodological perspective, the 
different results obtained across cues demonstrate that the results from the previous studies 
are not an artifact of  merely providing participants with another category to estimate. 
TABLE 11:  CUEING LESS OBVIOUS CATEGORIES 
CUE  N  Change in  Change in other  Change in  Change in 
CGS  costs  profit  fairness 
Labor  20  -6.3  (8.5)  +8.0 (9.1)  -1.7 (5.0)  +0.10 (0.64) 
t(19) = 3.31  t(19) = 3.95  t(19) = 1.53  t(19) = 0.69 
p< .01  p< .01  p=.07  p=.25 
Rent  20  -2.4 (5.6)  +7.5 (7.7)  -5.1 (7.7)  +0.35 (0.81) 
t(19) = 1.91  t(19) = 4.34  t(19) = 2.91  t(19) = 1.93 
p=.04  p< .01  p< .01  p=.03 
Mark- 19  -1.6 (5.0)  +11.8 (6.7)  -8.2 (7.9)  +0.42 (0.69) 
downs  t(18) = 1.37  t(18) = 7.67  t(18) = 4.53  t(18) = 2.65 
p=.09  p< .01  p< .01  p< .01 
In light of  the preceding findings, the question still remains:  why don't people 
spontaneously and fully consider costs when jUdging price faimess?  First, we propose that 
people lack accurate mental models of  the costs associated with a product and therefore are 
unable to generate these cost categories spontaneously. This explanation is borne out in 
research on algorithmic decomposition, which suggests that people experience difficulty in 
generating such algorithms in estimation tasks (MacGregor and Armstrong 1994). Moreover, 
research on hypothesis generation suggests that people stop too soon in generating 
hypotheses (Shaklee and Fischhoff 1982) and underestimate the other non-generated 
hypotheses (Gettys and Fisher 1979; Gettys, Mehle, and Fisher 1986). Second, even if  cost 
categories do come to mind, people may have inaccurate perceptions of  those costs, just as 
their perceptions of  profit appear to be quite inaccurate. In essence, decomposing the task is 37 
unlikely to improve overall estimation accuracy if  the component tasks are no easier than the 
fair price estimate itself. When people base fair price judgments on costs and profits, sellers 
have an opportunity to improve price fairness perceptions by educating consumers regarding 
the costs associated with their products. The fairness results from the present experiment bear 
this out. Increases in perceived cost that lowered perceived profit also increased perceived 
fairness. A similar relationship between profit and fairness was observed in experiments 4 
and 9. A reasonable question to ask, however, is whether this relationship between costs and 
faimess is robust across cost categories. We investigate this question in the following study. 
Experiment 11: "Unfair" Costs 
The principle of  dual entitlement suggests that firms are entitled to raise prices in the 
face of  increased costs. However, intuition and the popular press suggest that not all costs are 
deemed appropriate, and it would be folly to educate consumers about them. For example, 
educating consumers about the large bonuses paid to a firm's senior executives seems 
unlikely to improve consumer perceptions of  the fairness of  a fimi's prices. Consumer 
reaction to other costs incurred routinely by firms is less obvious. We first ran a pilot study to 
examine the basic question of  fair costs and then followed with a test of  spontaneity. 
Pilot Study. Participants were given a revenue breakdown for two firms that included 
cost of  goods sold, labor (versus promotional) costs, all other costs, and profits. Labor 
(promotional) costs were 20% (40%) for FirmA and 40% (20%) for Firm B. Overall costs 
and net margin were held constant. Participants were then asked to assess the fairness of 
prices at the two firms. 
Participants in the [labor / promotion] condition were told: 
We are interested in your views on firm finances. As you know, firms make 
a profit from selling goods. Overall profit is a function of  many factors, 
including costs. [For example, firms that make athletic gear must pay for the 
cost of  goods sold (materials used to make their goods), labor costs (to pay for labor in the manufacture of  goods, etc.), and all other costs. / For 
example, fIrms that make athletic gear must pay for the cost of  goods sold 
(materials used to make their goods), promotional costs (including 
advertising, promotions, and endorsements) and all other costs.]  These 
costs can vary from firm to fIrm for reasons that may be under the firm's 
control or not. Profit (after taxes) is the money left over after fIrms have 
covered all of  their costs. 
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Participants read the following information and then judged price fairness for each fIrm on a 
seven-point scale. 
Please take a moment to look over fmances for the following two fIrms 
selling athletic gear. In doing so, assume that overall revenue and total costs 
are equal for the two fIrms. In other words, the fIrms have the exact same 
net profIt margin after taxes. 
Firm  CGS 
FirmA  35% 













Results showed that fairness ratings for the two fIrms varied as a function of  whether 
labor or promotional costs were described (F(I, 36) = 6.81,p =  .01). As indicated in table 12, 
a fIrm described as devoting 40% of  its revenue to labor and 20% to "all other costs" was 
perceived as fairer than a firm that devoted 40% of  its revenue to promotion and 20% to "all 
other costs." These results were obtained even though the net margin at each firm was equal 
and low (5%). Thus, not all costs are fair nor, as also shown in experiment 5, are equal 
profIts equally fair. TABLE 12:  FAIRNESS AS A FUNCTION OF LABOR VERSUS PROMOTIONAL 
COSTS 
Cost Cued  N  Firm A (20%)  Firm B (40%) 
Labor  19  4.26 (l.33)  4.79 (1.18) 
Promotions  19  4.84 (0.90)  4.26 (0.99) 
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These results prompted the main study, which employed a brand name familiar to 
most consumers to assess the question of  spontaneity. Nike is an interesting example of  a 
fIrm that manufactures a product with relatively low CGS and labor costs but relatively high 
promotional costs. Indeed, Nike has received a great deal of  publicity regarding its expensive 
promotional and sponsorship deals and criticism for its Third World labor practices. Insofar 
as consumers naturally consider such issues, Nike should provide a strong test of 
spontaneity. 
Method. The experiment used a 2 (promotions Cue) x 2 (Measurement Order) 
between-subjects design. Participants either were cued or not cued about Nike's promotional 
spending. When cued, promotion appeared as a separate line item; in the uncued condition, 
there was no mention of  promotional costs. Fairness was measured either before or after 
profIt estimation. The stimulus scenario (from the cued, cost-fIrst condition) read as follows: 
As you know, Nike is a leading manufacturer of sports apparel, producing 
over 70 million pairs of shoes per year in its factories. We would like your 
estimate of  the proportion ofNike's revenue that goes to cover material 
costs, the proportion that goes to cover promotional costs (including 
advertising and sponsorship) and the proportion that goes to cover all other remaining costs, as well as how much is left as Nike's profit (before taxes). 
On the lines below, you see a simplified breakdown of  a Nike income 
statement. Consider one dollar of  revenue. What is your estimate of  how 
much of  each dollar in sales is allocated to each of  these categories? 
Material Costs: 
Promotional Costs: 
All Other Costs: 
Profits: 
Total:  $1.00 
These participants then assessed the fairness ofNike prices on a seven-point scale. 
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Results. As expected, fairness was lower when costs were estimated first (F(1, 75) = 
5.73,p =  .02) but did not interact with cueing for any of  the measures of  concern (all F<l). 
With regard to the measures of  primary interest (see table 13), cueing promotions 
significantly reduced estimates of  profit (F(l, 76) = 6.81,p = .01) and other costs (F(l, 76) = 
37.21, p < .001) but had no effect on CGS estimates (F < 1). Thus, promotional costs-even 
for a heavily promoted brand such as Nike--may not be spontaneously considered in their 
entirety. Moreover, the promotional cue had no effect on fairness ratings (F < I), although 
fairness was directionally lower when promotional costs were cued. Intuition and the notion 
of  dual entitlement (as well as many of  our previous results) suggest that perceived fairness 
should rise as profits decline due to higher costs. Clearly, price fairness judgments are guided 
by more than a simplistic view of  entitlement. Controlling for profit margins, the route by 
which a firm achieves profit margins influences consumer perceptions of  fairness. The 
present results indicate that consumers may be naive not only about corporate profit and 
costs but also corporate strategy. Different-yet legitimate-methods of  achieving 
competitive advantage are not viewed as equally fair. Promotion 
Uncued 
Cued 
TABLE 13:  CUEING UNFAIR PROMOTION COSTS 
N  CGS  Promotion  Other  Profit  Fairness 
43  16.37 
(10.91 ) 



















Taken together, these experiments suggest that consumers may possess inappropriate 
beliefs about the competitive marketplace. Profits are viewed as high and sticky; many costs 
appear to be largely ignored; and, some costs are viewed as fairer than others. As in the 
preceding sections, the implications are that consumers will be predisposed toward 
dissatisfaction with firms, and firms will be frustrated by consumer naivete. 
GOODS VERSUS SERVICES 
Levitt (1981) has argued that, relative to manufacturers, providers of  less tangible 
services find it difficult to convey long-term value of  their offerings due to the lower salience 
of  their benefits. We leave open the validity of  Levitt's conclusion but raise a related point 
concerning the cost side of  the value equation. As several of  the preceding studies indicate, 
not all costs are factored into the final price of  an offering. Because the perceived fairness of 
a price is determined by the costs incurred by the vendor (Thaler 1985), fairness will vary as 
a function of  the salience of  those costs. If  so, the distinction between goods and services is 
noteworthy (see also Berry and Yadav 1996). A plausible assumption is that when assessing 
the costs to a manufacturer, the cost most salient to consumers is the variable material cost. 
Similarly, the most salient cost faced by retailers is the CGS (as our preceding studies show). 42 
Thus, tangible costs may serve as a reference point on which consumers may anchor their 
assessment of  fair price of  a good. In contrast, a pure service offers no such anchor and, 
consequently, should prompt greater variation in the perceived fairness of  its price, ceteris 
paribUS. From the firm's perspective, it might be the case that, absent an anchor, service 
providers have more latitude to charge a price that corresponds to the value offered to the 
consumer. From a different perspective, consumers may be insensitive to the larceny 
involved in failing to pay for products and services that have few obvious tangible costs-as 
seen recently in the "sharing" of  music via the Internet. 
The true scope of  this issue is too broad to be treated systematically here. Instead, we 
provide some illustrations of  how the salience of  CGS vis-a-vis other costs can affect 
perceptions of  fairness in product versus service contexts. 
Experiment 12: Where Can Profits Be Made? 
We begin with a relatively simple illustration of  differences in fair pricing for goods 
versus services. In this study, participants were asked to judge the fairness of  a change in 
price of  either the product or service component of  an offering within a single firm. The 
context was the Sunday pricing schedule at an auto repair shop. 
Method. The experiment used a five-group between-subjects design. In the first 
condition, participants read the following scenario and rated faimess on a seven-point scale: 
Imagine that you live in a small town, where the only car repair shop in 
town is open on Monday to Saturday and closed otherwise. The auto 
mechanic (who owns and runs this car repair shop) charges a total of  $60 for 
his labor and $60 for parts (based on the average car repair in this shop). 
You convince the mechanic that people often have car trouble on Sundays 
and would really find it attractive to find a repair shop that is open on 
Sunday. The mechanic is very reluctant but agrees. For this average car 
repair, he decides to charge a total of  $80 for his labor and $60 for parts on 
Sunday. AB a customer on Sunday, how fair do you think this pricing is? 43 
A second group was provided with the identical scenario with the exception that the 
charges were reversed (i.e., $60 for labor and $80 for parts). A third group was given a 
combined price ($140) rather than itemized prices. A fourth group provided fair prices in an 
open-ended format. A fIfth group was presented with the three pricing alternatives and asked 
to choose the fairest. 
Results. As shown in table 14, participants judged it fairer to increase the service 
price (Le., mechanic's labor) rather than the goods price (Le., parts) (between-subjects F(I, 
46) =  8.43,p < .01). The markup on parts was deemed particularly unfair (M= 3.13 out of  7). 
This result runs counter to the principle of  dual entitlement, which should allow sellers to 
pass on increased costs to buyers without retribution. Participants in the open-ended 
condition provided consistent responses; that is, they raised labor prices (M  = $70.94, SD = 
12.41) more than parts prices (M= $62.50, SD = 6.83; F(I, 15) =  7.47,p = .02). Even when 
the equivalence of  the three pricing strategies was made transparent by providing all three 
options and asking for a choice, the majority of  participants (15 out of  17, or 88%) chose to 
increase labor rather than parts or the combined total. 
TABLE 14:  JUDGING WEEKEND FAIR PRICES 
Price increase applied to:  N  Fairness rating 
Parts  16  3.13 (1.75) 
Labor  17  5.12 (1.69) 
Combined  16  4.25 (2.41) 44 
Our interpretation of  these results is that parts have a tangible CGS and that markups 
above the normal selling price create excess profits. The markup on parts was deemed as 
unfair, even though it is clear from the other responses that participants believed it was 
appropriate for the mechanic to receive extra compensation for work performed on Sunday. 
It  is difficult to rule out all alternative explanations using a single underlying 
scenario, and therefore we attempted to gather converging evidence in several additional 
studies that instantiated very different contexts. In the next study we examine the reverse 
case in which the seller's cost is not marked up but rather amortized over time. 
Experiment 13:  When Can Profits be Made? 
This experiment examines the effect of  a seller's sunk costs as a function of  whether 
those costs are incurred in the form of a product or service. Research suggests that people 
may adapt to a previously incurred cost over time and therefore become less susceptible to 
the sunk-cost effect (Gourville and Soman 1998). The scenario, designed to be relevant to 
our participant population, required participants to assess the fair price of  a good or service 
either within its immediate time of  production or several months later. Specifically, 
participants were asked to estimate the fair price for note-taking (service) or a textbook 
(good) at the beginning or end of  the semester (time perspective manipulation). Although all 
costs may be amortized over time, our hypothesis is that amortization will not occur equally 
for goods and services due to the more tangible costs of  goods. 
Method. The experiment was a 2 (Service / Good Frame) x 2 (prospective / 
Retrospective) between-subjects design. The four scenarios read as follows: 
Imagine that you sign up for a new elective class in the English department, entitled 
Business Themes in Popular Literature. As part of  a class project, you are required to 
buy a paperback fiction book from a store like Barnes & Noble. Shortly after the first 
day, you drop the class. Assume that you do not want the book and that there is no 
buy-back for the book. Someone you meet is taking the class, has not yet bought the book and offers to pay you for the book that you will not use. You agree. What do 
you think is a fair price?  (Book/Before Condition) 
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Imagine that you just completed...  As part of  a class project, you were required ... 
You took the class pass/fail and found that you could pass without reading the book, 
so you never did. Assume that you do not want the book and that there is no buy-back 
for the book. You meet someone who is taking the class next term for a grade and 
offers to pay you for the book that you did not use. You agree. What do you think is a 
fair price?  (Book/After Condition) 
Imagine that you sign up ...  Assume that it is a very small class so there is no TV 
replay. The instructor has no class attendance policy. You meet someone during the 
fIrst class who cannot attend the class sessions. This person offers to pay you if  you 
are willing to provide a copy of  the class notes that you will take this term. You 
agree. What do you think is a fair price? (NoteslBefore Condition) 
Imagine that you just completed ... Assume that it is a very small class so there is no 
TV replay. The instructor has no class attendance policy. You meet someone who has 
just signed up for the same class next term and cannot attend the class sessions. This 
person offers to pay you if  you are willing to provide a copy of  the class notes that 
you took in the previous term. You agree. What do you think is a fair price? 
(Notes/After Condition) 
Results. An ANOVA on the fair price data in table 15 revealed a signifIcant main 
effect of  good versus service (F(l, 109) = 4.86, p = .03). However, the interaction with 
perspective was not significant (F(1, 109) = 1.64, p = .20). Because of  differences in 
variance, simple effect comparisons were conducted. For books, time perspective had no 
effect on fair price estimates (F < 1); for notes, time perspective did influence fair price 
estimates (F(1, 83) = 3.81,p =  .05). SpecifIcally, fair price estimates were lower in retrospect 
than prospect for notes, suggesting that the fair price of  a service is more sensitive to a shift 
in temporal perspective than is the fair price of  a good. 46 
Moreover, the key finding-and the driver of  the price responses--<:an be found in 
the rationales provided by participants for their fair price estimates and in the prices 
associated with each rationale (see table 15). No participant in the good condition cited sunk 
cost as a rationale for setting price. Book prices were set almost exclusively by the estimated 
selling price of  the book, with more participants specifying a used price in retrospect than 
prospect (X2(1) =  13.87, p< .005). Based on participants who specified an actual price, the 
new and used price did not differ significantly (F < l). This result is consistent with our 
hypothesis regarding CGS as an anchor for products and stands in sharp contrast to the 
service conditions in which rationales shifted dramatically as a function of  time (X2(3) = 
2l.57,p < .005). In prospect, participants tended to base the selling price on the cost of  their 
labor, which led to a very high selling price. In retrospect, the price was significantly lower 
because the cost of  labor was discounted. These participants, who viewed their labor as sunk, 
charged the lowest price-even though the results show that the (labor-based) value of  these 
notes was quite high. Prices based on sunk cost were much lower than prices based on hours 
oflabor (F(l, 82) =  26.90, p < .001). Overall, service prices appeared to be more susceptible 
to temporal framing than goods prices due to the latter's tangible reference point. TABLE 15:  FAIR PRICES FOR SERVICE VERSUS GOOD 
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME PERSPECTIVE 
Good! 
Service 
Time perspective  N  Rationales provided 
Book (good)  After 
Book (good)  Before 
Notes (service)  After 
Notes (service)  Before 
40  Book used price - 27 
Book original price - 12 
Other-l 
42  Book used price - 19 
Book original price - 23 
Other-O 
68  Notes market price - 14 
Sunkcost-12 (31.6%) 
Time-based price - 10 (26.3%) 
Other-32 
45  Notes market price - 10 
Sunk cost - 4 (11.4%) 





n =  12 
26.9 (17.8) 
n = 16 
46.1  (58.6) 
n =  61 
67.6 (75.9) 
n =27 Follow-up analysis of  trimmed fair price estimates as a function of  rationale: 
Rationale  N  Fair price 
Book discount price  19  29.30 (17.12) 
Book original price  10  26.50 (15.85) 
Notes market price  20  37.53 (35.16) 
Sunk cost  13  15.38 (18.20) 
Time-based price  15  91.40 (67.94) 
Other  11  36.36 (48.02) 
tNote:  Ss who provided rationales frequently omitted fair price estimates (for 
example, by stating "same price that I paid for hook originally" and failing to 
specify price). Because of  missing data and variance heterogeneity, the 
ANOV  A (reported on data trimmed at 3 SD) must be interpreted with caution. It 
is reported for completeness and is consistent with analysis of  cognitive 
responses. 
Experiment 14:  Pricing Over Multiple Transactions 
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Our final illustration involves the pricing of  multiple goods-versus-services 
transactions. Perceived fairness of  a current transaction can be influenced by the price 
charged during a previous transaction. A typical test of  dual entitlement involves repeat 
purchase within a product category in which prices rise from one period to another and the 
costs to vendor either rise or stay stable. However, consider the case of  repeat payment for a 
single item-as when a product is rented rather than purchased-and neither the price nor the 
cost to the vendor change. For the vendor, profit is obtained from each transaction. Given 
enough transactions, the cumulative rental price will exceed the vendor's purchase price of 
the good (CGS). We hypothesize a decline in the perceived fairness of  the product rental 
price as the number of  transactions increases. In contrast, consider multiple purchases of  a 
single service that provides benefits that are similar to those obtained by the product. We hypothesize that although the benefits provided by the good and service may be analogous, 
the situations are noncomparable due to the absence of  a CGS for the latter. Consumers 
should expect to compensate the timellabor costs of  a service provider, regardless of  the 
number of  iterations. 
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The present experiment compares the perceived fairness of  a good versus service as a 
function of  the number of  purchases. The service condition may be viewed as a control 
against which the product rental condition is compared. 
Method. The experiment used a 2 (Service/Good Frame) x 2 (Single/Multiple 
Transactions) mixed design. Participants were asked to judge fairness of  prices charged to 
stay at a hostel for 1 night or 30 nights, where a portion of  the nightly charge was designated 
for a service (cleaning) or a good (sleep-sack). The basic scenario read as follows: 
Imagine that you are on a summer vacation in Europe. You will be spending 
most of  this time with friends and family in Europe. You are also planning 
to stay at youth hostels in places you don't have friends or family. You think 
hostels are a good choice because they are relatively inexpensive compared 
to ordinary hotels and are frequented by other young people like yourself. 
In the good frame, participants were then told: 
You discover that there are two types of  hostels in Europe. For Type I 
hostels, guests are asked to provide their own sleep-sack (a type of  sheet) 
for their bed. For Type II hostels, the hostel provides sleep-sacks and guests 
pay an additional $3 per night for rental. (This exactly covers the hostels' 
costs for the sleep-sacks themselves, since hostels are not-for-profit 
organizations and associated laundry services have been donated by a local 
organization.)  The basic charge for staying at a hostel is $15/night. 
In the service frame, participants instead were told: 
You discover that there are two types of  hostels in Europe. For Type I 
hostels, guests are asked to clean up after themselves. For Type II hostels, the hostel has a cleaning service and guests pay an additional $3 per night 
toward this service. (This exactly covers the hostels' costs for the cleaning 
service, since hostels are not-far-profit organizations.)  The basic charge for 
staying at a hostel is $15/night. 
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To manipulate the number of  transactions (shown here for the good conditions only), 
participants were told the following when estimating the fairness of  a single transaction: 
As it turns out, you will be staying at hostels for one night during your 
vacation. Therefore your hostel budget during this vacation would be: 
Type I Hostel  $15 / night x 1 night = $15 
Type II Hostel $18 / night x 1 night = $18 ($3 is for the sleep-sack) 
When estirnating fairness for 30 repeat transactions, the instructions read: 
As it turns out, you will be staying at hostels for 30 nights during your 
vacation. Therefore your hostel budget during this vacation would be: 
Type I hostel  $15/ night x 30 nights = $450 
Type II hostel $18 / night x 30 nights = $540 ($90 is for the sleep-sack) 
Participants judged price fairness for the Type I and Type II hostels on a 7  -point scale. 
We have argued that fair prices are "stickier" for goods than services due to the 
existence of  a tangible CGS. If  so, perceptions of  fairness for the Type II Hostel should 
decline in the "good" frame from  I to 30 nights, whereas perceptions of  fairness for the 
service should remain constant. 
Results. Table 16 reports the mean fairness scores. As expected, Type I hostels were 
judged equally fair across all conditions (because prices for these hostels did not include the 
additional good/service charge). A repeated measures analysis of  both Type I and Type II 
hostel fairness ratings revealed a significant two-way interaction contrast (F(l, 67) = 4.87,p 
= .03) and a marginal effect for number of  nights (F(1, 67) = 3.49,p = .06). The interaction 
can be understood by examining the difference in fairness ratings for Type I and Type II 
hostels (where the Type I hostel fairness rating serves as a control or baseline fairness 51 
measure). Fairness ratings were identical across the number of  nights for Type I and Type II 
hostels in the service frame; Type II  hostel prices that included charges for cleaning services 
were judged slightly fairer than Type I hostel prices, regardless of  whether the stay was for I 
night or 30 nights (F<l). On the other hand, the pattern offairness ratings in the good frame 
indicates that Type II hostel prices were judged equally fair (compared to Type I hostel 
prices) when the stay was for 1 night but significantly less fair when the stay was for 30 
nights (F(I, 32) = 11.69,p < .01). In other words, fairness did not differ for Type I hostel 
prices (all F < 1) but did differ for Type II Hostel prices, as hypothesized (F(l, 67) =  4.58,p 
=.04). 
TABLE 16:  PRICE FAIRNESS FOR SERVICES VERSUS GOODS 
OVER MULTIPLE TRANSACTIONS 
Good!  Transaction  N  Type I  Type II  Difference 
service  fairness  fairness  Score 
Sleep-sack  Single  17  5.82 (1.29)  6.18 (0.88)  0.35 (0.79) 
(good)  (1  night) 
Sleep-sack  Multiple (30  17  6.06 (0.90)  5.53 (1.18)  -0.53 (0.72) 
(good)  nights) 
Cleaning  Single  19  5.89 (1.05)  6.11 (0.99)  0.21 (0.54) 
(service)  (1  night) 
Cleaning  Multiple (30  18  6.17 (1.34)  6.44 (0.78)  0.28 (1.36) 
(service)  nights) 
Note:  differences in bold are significantly different from zero (p<.05) Experiment 14a: Holding the Transaction Constant 
Direct comparisons of  products and services are made difficult by the many 
dimensions on which they differ. Thus, we attempted to replicate experiment 14 in another 
context that controls for these differences by framing the same transaction as a good versus 
service. 
Method. The experiment used a 2 (Service/Good Frame) x 2 (Single/Multiple 
Transactions) between-subjects design. Participants were asked to judge fairness of  prices 
charged for entertaining a child once or 20 times, where the entertainment was framed as a 
service or a good. The scenario for a single transaction read as follows: 
Imagine that you are a working mother with a young school-age child. During 
the next month, you will be working on an important project. The project 
requires you to work late at the office for one extra hour once during the 
month. You need to find some entertainment for your child during this time. 
You don't have any other options. 
In the mUltiple transaction condition, the scenario was modified as follows: 
Imagine that you are a working mother with a young school-age child. During 
the next month, you will be working on an important project. The project 
requires you to work late at the office for one extra hour each day (i.e., 20 
times during the month). You need to find some entertainment for your child 
during this time. You don't have any other options. 
All participants then read about a solution to their problem. 
You discover a local company called "Fun4Kids."  It is a local reputable firm 
that provides entertainment for children under adult supervision to ensure 
safety. In one ofFun4Kids' programs, an adult entertains your child with a 
board game. The program comes highly recommended---other parents who 
52 use the program frequently say their child loves playing the game with the 
adult and never tires of  it. Your child has tried the game and really loved it. 
Participants in the service condition were then asked [with the multiple transaction amount 
shown in brackets]: 
The charge for the adult's services is $15, for a total price of  $15 [$300] to 
entertain your child. How fair do you think this price is? 
In the good condition, the same transaction was framed as rental of  a good. 
The charge for board game rental is $15, for a total price of  $15 [$300] to 
entertain your child. How fair do you think this price is? 
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Results. An ANOVA revealed a main effect of  transaction (F(l, 55) = 39.70, P < 
.001) that was qualified by an interaction with frame (F(l, 55) = 6.36,p = .02). As the 
pattern of  means in table 17 indicates, fairness ratings declined more from a single to 
multiple transactions for goods (F(l, 28) = 48.58,p < .001) than services (F(l, 27) = 5.88,p 
= .02). This result is consistent with the previous experiment that also illustrated limits on 
product, but not service, pricing. Note that in the present case the good condition subsumed 
the service condition, given that the good required not only rental but also the adult's labor. 
Thus, the low perceived fairness in the multiple-good condition seems particularly 
inappropriate. 54 
TABLE 17:  PRICE FAIRNESS FOR SERVICES VERSUS GOODS 
OVER MULTIPLE TRANSACTIONS 
Frame  Transaction  N  Fairness rating 
Good  Single (l use)  14  5.86 (1.17) 
Good  Multiple (20 uses)  16  2.69 (1.30) 
Service  Single (1  use)  14  5.36 (1.65) 
Service  Multiple (30 uses)  15  4.00 (1.36) 
Taken together, these experiments illustrate important differences in price fairness for 
goods versus services. Earlier studies showed that the fair price of a good is based largely on 
CGS. The present study shows that even when the price of  a good is viewed as relatively fair, 
multiple "purchases" of  the good are deemed unfair vis-a-vis multiple purchases of  a 
service-even when expected value of  the good and service to the consumer is high and 
equal. The repeated rental of  a good provides the vendor with continuously increasing 
revenue but constant CGS constrains the fair rental price and profits over time. 
CONCLUSION 
Most prior research has examined price faimess at the transaction level. The present 
research is built on this tradition but also shows the importance of  examining fairness across 
transactions and against multiple reference points. In a series of  experiments, we examined 
three reference points-past prices, comparison prices, and costs-that lead consumers to 
systematically underestimate fair prices. 
When "looking back" and assessing prices over time, consumers systematically 
underestimate the effects of  inflation. Potential corrective strategies (i.e., providing explicit 
inflation rates, current prices, or historical data) were insufficient to correct for 55 
underestimation. Indeed, the salience of  recent price data appeared to exacerbate perceptions 
of  unfairness arising from underestimation of  inflation. When "looking across" and 
comparing prices, consumers infer price unfairness. When comparing store prices, 
consumers tend to attribute differences to profit rather than costs. Even after controlling for 
profit levels, consumers take into account how profits are made when comparing prices. 
Corrective efforts that explain price differences as a consequence of  marketing strategy may 
be insufficient to improve fairness perceptions. In fact, certain marketing strategies (e.g., 
margin versus volume strategies) may be judged unfair even when beyond the store's 
control. From a consumers' perspective, price differences appear fair(est) only if  they can be 
attributed to quality differences. However, when consumers "look inward" and assess costs, 
other cost categories besides cost of  goods sold are likely to be ignored. Cueing other costs 
(e.g., more cost categories, more details about costs, and less obvious costs) may provide 
only limited relief to the vendor. Profit estimates appear to be sticky and high, and some 
costs (e.g., promotional costs) can stimulate feelings of  unfairness. For vendors of  goods, the 
news may be particularly bad. Due to the anchor associated with the consumer's estimate of 
the CGS, the likelihood of extracting a price that approximates the good's expected value to 
the consumer may be low in non-monopoly markets. Although services appear to have a 
little more pricing leeway, unfairness perceptions driven by cognitive reference points are 
nonetheless chronic among consumers. 
The studies reported here have been wide-ranging but hardly comprehensive. A large 
opportunity exists to examine the issue of  perceived price fairness in ways that go beyond 
both the present results and the pioneering fmdings on dual entitlement. The importance of 
understanding the reference points used by consumers to judge price faimess should be self-
evident not only to marketers who develop pricing strategy but also to consumer researchers 
interested in purchase satisfaction. 56 
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